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I. Introduction
What do the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, rock star
Bono, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and Liberian
President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson all have in common? All of them
recently sat down for a chat at the World Economic Forum in
Davos. The topic was debt relief in Africa and the problem of
odious debt.' The so-called odious debt doctrine focuses on the
t Anita Ramasastry, Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington
School of Law. The author would like to thank Professors Adam Feibelman and Mitu
Gulati for their encouragement and their interest in the topic of odious debt.
I William L. Watts, Bono Returns to Keep Focus on Africa, MARKETWATCH, Jan.
26, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com (search for "Bono Returns to Keep Focus on
Africa," click on "Davos Notebook: Bono returns to keep focus on Africa" hyperlink).
DAVOS, Switzerland (MarketWatch)-Few celebrities were invited to Davos
for this year's annual gathering of the World Economic Forum, but rock star
Bono, a regular fixture of the gathering for the world's corporate and political
elites, returned to a warm welcome Friday, sitting down with Bill Gates, Tony
Blair, Liberian President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson and South African President
Thebo Mbeki to spotlight Africa's woes.
Bono said corruption is a top impediment to the continent's progress, but
charged that the way industrialized countries treat Africa is also a problem.
Liberia, for instance, still struggles with "odious debt" left over from dictatorial
regimes, he said.
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forgiveness or cancellation of sovereign debt once it has been
created.' This type of analysis centers primarily on the role of the
borrower and whether or not the terms or conditions of lending
were "odious" in nature. Scholars and policymakers who have
grappled with the issue of odious debt have focused on when
successor regimes may have a reason for nonpayment of loans, or
for debt cancellation.'
In an iconic moment for the annual retreat, Bono in 2005 joined with Gates,
former President Bill Clinton, Blair and Mbeki to call for a concerted effort to
end poverty in Africa.
Id.
I PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD
WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991) (quoting ALEXANDER SACK, LES EFFETS DES
TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS
FINANCItRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] (1927); ALEXANDER SACK, LA SUCCESSION AUX DETTES
PUBLIQUES D'ITAT [THE SUCCESSION OF THE PUBLIC DEBTS OF THE STATE] (1929)),
available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&
AreaID=3; see also Ashaq Kalfan, Odious Debt: Definition, Application and Context,
EURODAD Annual Conference (2006), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/
odiousdebts/publications/ODashfaqEURODAD.pdf.
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State,
but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights
against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population of all the State.
This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime's debt, a personal debt
of the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power.
The reason these "odious" debts cannot be considered to encumber the territory
of the State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determine
the legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State must be
incurred and the funds from it employed for the needs and in the interests of the
State.
"Odious" debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the
creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not compromise the
latter-in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the government
which incurs them-except to the extent that real advantages were obtained
from these debts. The creditors have committed a hostile act with regard to the
people; they can't therefore expect that a nation freed from a despotic power
assume the "odious" debts, which are personal debts of that power.
ADAMS, Chapter 17, available at, http://www.probeinternational.org/probeint/Odious
Debts/OdiousDebts/index.html.
2 See, e.g., Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 82 (2006); see also Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious
Regimes?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (forthcoming 2007) (advocating UN
Security Council as intergovernmental entity that would declare regimes odious); Lee C.
ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES & ODIOUS DEBT
Rather than focusing on debt in isolation, it may be useful to
view odious debt as one category of problematic payments made
to a state-payments corrupt political leaders use for illicit
personal enrichment or to engage in repressive behavior. Funds
from loans as well as revenues can be diverted from state
treasuries into the personal bank accounts of corrupt leaders.3
Loans and revenues can also be used to fund systematic
oppression of individuals or minority groups.4 Odious debt is but
one category of odious payments generally. This paper uses the
term "odious payments" to refer to payments made to a sovereign
that are misappropriated by corrupt political leaders or that allow
them to perpetuate violence against their populations. The funds
that are used by the corrupt leaders are not available to successor
governments that need funds to repay sovereign debt and to feed
their citizens.
Putting an end to borrowing or lending is not the best solution
to the problem of odious debt. A better solution would be to
create mechanisms that allow for an accounting of funds disbursed
to odious regimes and to require that odious regimes keep the
funds within their respective countries. To the extent that a leader
knows that sovereign loans or royalty payments are being
disclosed, and that he cannot have access to Swiss or Cypriot
Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2007) available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/
00001567/01/Dilemma ofOdiousDebts_9-20-06.pdf.
3 Time For Transparency, Coming Clean on Oil, Mining and Gas Revenues,
GLOBAL WITNESS (2004), http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?resid=102698
("Across the globe, revenues from oil, gas and mining that should be funding sustainable
economic development have been misappropriated and mismanaged. This Global
Witness report considers five major examples of this problem: Kazakhstan, Congo
Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Nauru."); David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and
Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2007) abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=957811
("[t]raditional odious debt doctrine therefore fails to capture many of the evils of abusive
regimes and the variety of financial burdens left for their successors").
4 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME TRANSPARENCY, No ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 57-76, Jan. 13,
2004, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/angola0l0 4 .pdf; Jill
Shankleman, Managing Natural Resource Wealth, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, (Aug. 2006);
CORENE CROSSIN & JESSIE BANFIELD, CONFLICT AND PROJECT FINANCE: EXPLORING
OPTIONS FOR BETrER MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT RISK 7 (2006),
http://conflictsensitivity.org/files/publib/Conflict-Project-Finance.pdf.
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banks, he may be less likely to plunder.
Why might these solutions be preferable to invoking a doctrine
of odious debt? First, as some commentators have noted, all funds
are fungible.5 To the extent that a particular loan is not granted, a
despot may take funds from another source to line his pockets or
fill his private bank accounts. Second, the issue of which regimes
are "odious" requires one to make a foray into the realm of
political decision-making.6 It may be difficult and unrealistic to
find any particular intergovernmental body that can or will declare
regimes "odious."
This article focuses on ways to stem the tide of odious
payments and to stop such payments, when made, from moving
offshore into foreign bank accounts. To the extent that such
payments leave a country, fewer funds are available to repay
sovereign debts in the event of a regime change, or to feed and
shelter the population.7 This article focuses on emerging anti-
corruption mechanisms as a means of dealing with odious
payments and odious debt. It also focuses on the role of financial
institutions (banks) as gatekeepers. Part I of this article focuses on
the way in which banks are involved in odious payments: lending
or extending credit, advising corrupt regimes, and helping hide the
assets of political elites. Part II examines the use of a "publish
what you lend" framework to provide for transparency in
sovereign lending. Part III focuses on the use of anti-corruption
measures to deal with capital flight. The use of procedures, such
as heightened scrutiny for politically exposed persons, may be an
important step in stopping capital flight when odious debt
payments are being concealed by financial institutions. Also, the
criminalization of illicit enrichment or inexplicable wealth may
prove a valuable tool for prosecuting corrupt leaders.8
5 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 2, at 2.
6 Id. at 11-12, 21; Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 3, at 91-92.
7 In sub-Saharan Africa, some empirical evidence shows that external borrowing
may have fueled capital flight from the 1970s through the 1990s. See James K. Boyce &
Leonce Ndikumana, Africa's Debt: Who Owes Whom? 2-7 (Univ. of Mass. at Amherst,
Political Econ. Research Inst. Working Paper Series No. 48, 2002), available at
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working-papers/working-papers- I -
50/WP48.pdf.
8 WORLD BANK, ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKIT 6, 214-19 (2001), http://www.
worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/aclawissues.pdf.
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II. Bank Involvement in Odious Payments: Lending and
Concealing
There are several ways, including financial advising, lending,
and capital flight, in which banks provide financial services to
sovereigns that may promote violence or corruption.
One method of promoting violence or corruption can occur
when banks serve as financial advisors to a sovereign that is
engaged in human rights violations.9 For example, in 1997 a
banker for Jardine Fleming was fired for providing financial
advisory services to the Papua New Guinea government.1" The
government reportedly requested financial advice about how to
finance mercenaries employed in an effort to contain a popular
uprising against the Bougainville copper mine, operated by Rio
Tinto, an Australian mining company."
Banks may also be involved with sovereign lending activities
that lead to the disbursement of odious payments. 2 Such lending
can occur in many forms. Financiers may provide loans to
sovereign governments that engage in human rights abuses or
other forms of systematic repression. 3 In this regard, many
commentators have pointed to commercial loans made to the
apartheid government in South Africa. 4 Many European and
North American banks were active in apartheid South Africa, such
as the United Kingdom-based Barclays which reportedly made
9 JESSICA BANFIELD & CORENE CROSSIN, CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROJECT FINANCE:
BETTER LENDING PRACTICE IN CONFLICT-PRONE STATES 17 (2006), available at
http://www.international-alert.org/publications/271.php, (follow link to "Download Pdf
Version") (citing J. Ridding, HK Banker Fired Over Mercenaries: Jardine Fleming Acts





14 Id.; Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 3, at 83; Charles Peter Abrahams, The
Doctrine of 'Odious Debts:' Does International Law Provide a Remedy to Instances
Where Debts Are Contracted for Purposes of Committing Recognized International
Wrongful Acts? A Contemporary Case of the Apartheid Debts 82 (Aug. 2000)
(unpublished LLM Thesis, University Leiden), http://www.odiousdebts.org/
odiousdebts/publications/ApartheidDebtThesis.pdf (Abrahams is the attorney for Jubilee
South Africa as well as for plaintiffs in the apartheid litigation ongoing in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
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USD $725.4 million in loans to the apartheid regime. 15 Sovereign
bond offerings may also be used by repressive governments to
raise capital. 6 Commercial banks, for example, may provide trade
finance that enables governments to import weapons and other
equipment to be used in warfare. 7 Banks and other financial
institutions may also support the manufacture of war-related
items. "  According to the non-governmental organization
International Alert, "AXA, Dexia, Fortis, ING[,] and KBC have
been linked to the financing of cluster bombs, landmines, nuclear
weapons[,] and depleted uranium weapons."' 9  Export credit
agencies may also provide financing to support problematic
infrastructure projects in corrupt states as well as the support of
arms sales.2 °
In some countries-including Liberia and Angola-conflict
commodities such as timber, cobalt, diamonds, gold, and oil
generate "hard currency" that repressive regimes use to fund civil
war or violent conflict. 2' The connection between international
financial markets and conflict commodities has been well
established, and in some cases the conflict commodities
themselves are used for loan repayment.22 During the Sierra
Leone civil war, conflict diamonds were sold by the government
and rebel groups to finance a bloody conflict.23  International
15 BANFIELD & CROSSIN, supra note 9, at 17.
16 Id. ("Morgan Stanley led a sovereign bond offering by the government [Republic
of Guatemala] in November 2001. Citigroup served as the bookrunner for Guatemala's




20 See id.; ECA Watch: International NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies,
Problems by Issues-Arms Trade, http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/arms/index.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
21 BANFIELD & CROSSIN, supra note 9, at 18.
22 Id. "For instance, ING, UBS and HSBC have all extended loans or revolving
cash facilities to the Angolan government that were repaid in crude oil cargoes, rather
than cash." Id.; see GLOBAL WITNESS, A CRUDE AWAKENING: THE ROLE OF THE OIL AND
BANKING INDUSTRIES IN ANGOLA'S CIVIL WAR AND THE PLUNDER OF STATE ASSETS 15-17
(1999), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/l1999/cm
de.pdf.
23 See BANFIELD & CROSSIN, supra note 9, at 18.
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human rights nongovernmental organizations have identified
several banks, including ING Bank, ABN Amro Bank, and
specialty diamond-finance banks in Antwerp, Belgium, to pinpoint
the link between financing rough diamond trade with conflict2 4
In addition to lending to dictators, banks can act as agents for
odious regimes by helping political elites stash their
misappropriated funds or odious payments. 25  There are many
cases of ex-dictators who have plundered their national
treasuries.26  In some instances, misappropriated funds were
concealed by private banks.27  Successor governments
subsequently must try to recover stolen funds. 28 There are many
examples of successor governments attempting to find stolen
assets, including the Philippines after Fernandind Marcos, 29 Haiti
after the Duvalier family,3° Nigeria after Sani Abacha,31 and Zaire
24 Id.; see IAN SMILLIE, LANSANA GBERIE, & RALPH HAZELTON, THE HEART OF THE
MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY 46 (Partnership Africa
Canada 2000), available at http://www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/heart%20of%20the%20
matter.doc.
25 JONATHAN M. WINER & TRIFIN J. ROULE, THE FINANCE OF ILLICIT RESOURCE
EXTRACTION 18 (2003), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/
67ByDocName/TheFinanceoflllicitResourceExtraction/$FILE/WinerRoule.pdf; see also
Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies, Swiss Banks and International Human Rights, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 328 (1998).
26 Recovering Dictators' Plunder: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 3-
4 (2002); see Ramasastry, supra note 25, at 329; Jonathan M. Winer & Trifin J. Roule,
Follow the Money: the Finance of Illicit Resource Extraction, in NATURAL RESOURCES
AND VIOLENT CONFLICT 161, 167-68 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Bank
2003).
27 Winer & Roule, supra note 26, at 169-70; Ramasastry, supra note 25, at 329.
28 A summary of the legal proceedings of all the above-mentioned cases, with
special mention of the participation of U.S. banks can be read in Private Banking and
Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov. Aff., 106th Cong.
872-934 (Minority Staff Report for Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations) Nov. 9,
1999, available at, http://www.senate.gov/-govt-aff/I 1099_report.htm.
29 Ramasastry, supra note 25, at 430.
30 GAO REP. No. 04-1006, at 27 (2004).
31 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, ABACHA AND THE BANKERS: CRACKING THE
CONSPIRACY, FORUM ON CRIME AND SOCIETY at 111, U.N. Sales No. E.03.IV.2 (2002);
see also UNODC Asset Recovery Project in Nigeria, http://www.unodc.org
/unodc/en/corruption-projects-nigeria-project2.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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after its dictator Mobutu Sese Seku.32
Many-if not all-corrupt dictators who have transferred money
offshore for personal enrichment have done so with the aid of
correspondent or private banking services. In some
circumstances, political elites are selling off natural resources of
"conflict commodities ' 33 to continue to fund civil unrest and
military activities.34 Banks have been instrumental in laundering
and concealing the proceeds of the sale of conflict commodities.35
In 2005, US-based Riggs Bank was fined $41 million for assisting
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and Equatorial Guinean
President Obiang conceal their assets by failing to scrutinize their
suspicious transactions.36
III.Publish What You Lend?
One of the problems with odious debt, or of payments to a
non-democratic regime, is opacity. Citizens may not have an
accurate accounting of the funds received by their national
treasuries, adding to the difficulty of obtaining a true accounting
from a despotic leader. This begs the question: how can one
achieve transparency when it comes to odious payments?
Those who lend could be required to disclose both to investors
and the public what types of credit have been extended to a
32 Paul D. Ocheje, Refocusing International Law on the Quest for Accountability in
Africa: The Case Against the "Other" Impunity, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 749 (2002).
33 Nataliue Pauwels, Conflict Commodities: Addressing the Role of Natural
Resources in Conflict, International Security Information Service Briefing Paper No. 27
(March 2003), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/pan01/pan01.pdf. See generally
Ingrid J. Tamm, Dangerous Appetites: Human Rights Activism and Conflict
Commodities, 26 HuM. RTS. Q. 687 (2004).
34 See, e.g., PHILIPPE LE BILLON, THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF WAR: NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ARMED CONFLICTS, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 568-70, 561-84 (2001),
available at http://www.geog.ubc.ca/-lebillon/ecowar.pdf.
35 See Ramasastry, supra note 25, at 325.
36 See United States Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, In re Riggs Bank, Assessment of Civil money Penalty No. 2004-1, available
at, http://www.fincen.gov/riggsassessment3.pdf; Anita Ramasastry, Stopping Banks from
Hiding Human Rights Abusers' Money: A Recent Settlement by Riggs Bank Highlights
the Issue, FINDLAW, Apr. 4, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/
20050404.html; OPEN SOC'Y JUST. INST., LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE RESOURCE CURSE: A
DIGEST OF EXPERIENCE IN USING LAW TO COMBAT NATURAL RESOURCE CORRUPTION 33-
36 (2005), available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res-id=102966.
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particular sovereign. A useful model for disclosure focuses on
revenue transparency in natural resource payments. Revenue
transparency data could help citizens of poor countries hold their
governments accountable for the management of revenues
generated by state resources.
Business entities and financial institutions may be perceived to
be complicit in corruption and the deterioration of social
conditions in the countries where they operate, even when they
provide a transitioning economy with a valuable source of
investment.37 In some situations, a business may operate in a weak
governance zone, where the state is unwilling or unable to protect
its citizens from violence.38 In other situations, a business may be
alleged to have aided and abetted the activities of a repressive
government.3 9 Such investment, when managed transparently and
responsibly, could be a source for economic growth and
development that will benefit all citizens of these poor countries.4"
One existing model of payment transparency is the "Publish
What You Pay" (PWYP) campaign, which has been spearheaded
by the civil society organizations Open Society Institute and
Global Witness.41 PWYP calls for the "mandatory disclosure of
37 MARGARET JUNGK, THE DANISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEFINING THE
SCOPE OF BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD 1-3 (2005), available at
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/pdf files/Defining%20the%2Scope%20of%2OBu
siness%20Responsibiliy%20.pdf; UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, GLOBAL
COMPACT BUSINESS GUIDE FOR CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
1-2, 5 (2002), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issuesdoc/7.2.3/
BusinessGuide.pdf
38 OECD, INVESTMENT IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, SUMMARY OF
CONSULTATIONS 1-5 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/35397
593.pdf.
39 See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity From Nuremberg to
Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.91 (2002) (analyzing the role of
Unocal in its alleged involvement in Myanmar military government's repression of its
citizens).
40 IMF, GUIDE ON RESOURCE REVENUE TRANSPARENCY 4-6 (2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/grrt/eng/060705.pdf; Henry Parham, Promoting
Revenue Transparency in the Extractive Industries, Issue Paper, OECD Fifth Annual
Anti-corruption Conference (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
0/0/35592802.pdf.
41 See Publish What You Pay, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english (last
visited May 21, 2007); see also Revenue Watch Institute, http://www.revenuewatch.
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
taxes, fees, royalties[,] and other payments by oil, mining[,] and
gas companies to governments and other public agencies. 42 This
is meant to help end natural resource corruption by allowing
citizens to see what revenues are being paid to a government.43 As
the PWYP campaign notes:
[t]he call for companies to "publish what you pay" is a
necessary first step towards a more accountable system for
the management of natural resource revenues paid by
extractive industry companies to governments in resource-
rich developing countries .... If companies disclose what
they pay in revenues, and governments disclose their
receipts of such revenues, then members of civil society
will be able to compare the two and thus hold their
governments accountable for the management of revenues.
This will also help civil society groups to work towards a
democratic debate over the use and distribution of resource
revenues.44
In addition to the PWYP campaign, international financial
institutions and governments within the G-8 have also embraced
revenue transparency. 45  The British Government has supported
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 46 which
sets forth principles relating to disclosure of payments to
governments for resource extraction. EITI is supported by an
International Secretariat presently based in the United Kingdom's
Department for International Development. The Secretariat works
org/about.
42 Publish What You Pay, Objectives, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/
objectives/index.shtml (last visited May 21, 2007).
43 See id.
44 Publish What You Pay, Objectives, supra note 42.
45 The members of the Group of Seven (G-7) are Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, these countries account for
nearly two-thirds of global economic output. The leaders of these countries have met
annually since 1975. They discuss significant economic and political issues. The Group
of Eight (G-8) includes the G-7 countries plus Russia. Russia does not participate in
financial and economic discussions, which continue to be conducted by the G-7. See
United States Department of State, What is the G-8?, http://usinfo.state.gov/
ei/economic issues/group_ofL8/what istheg8.html.
46 See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative homepage, http://www.
eitransparency.org/ (last visited May 22, 2007).
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closely with the World Bank and the IMF.47  In addition to the
implementing governments, EITI is supported by many of the
largest oil and mining companies in the world, as well as investors
in those companies, and by civil society groups, many of which
work under the umbrella of the PWYP coalition and the Revenue
Watch Institute.48 A sovereign may have fewer opportunities to
divert funds if there is enhanced transparency in the lending
process.
Could Publish What You Lend work in the context of
sovereign debt? As noted above, there are multiple ways in which
regimes may be financed. Creditors and investors that provide
financing to sovereigns could be required to make affirmative
disclosures with respect to the amount of funds disbursed to a
sovereign. Sovereign debt may consist of a loan or may come in
the form of bond issuances.4 9 In the latter case, the underwriting
of sovereign debt is what could be disclosed.
It might be difficult for every entity that is an investor to
disclose the nature of sovereign debt because of the nature of
derivative instruments. At the same time, disclosure might be
limited to situations where an initial investment leads to the
disbursement of funds to a sovereign, as opposed to disclosure
based on who is an investor in a sovereign debt product.
The PWYP initiative already focuses on the role of banks in
lending and why transparency is important with respect to
sovereign lending. For example, PWYP "calls for all private,
commercial and retail banks to require transparency of revenues
from extractive industries as a condition for all resource-backed
47 For information on the World Bank and its institutions, see World Bank
homepage, http://web.worldbank.org. For information on the International Monetary
Fund, see IMF homepage, http://www.imf.org.
48 The Revenue Watch Institute is an outgrowth of the Open Society Institute. It is
a nonprofit organization with a mission "to improve democratic accountability in natural
resource-rich countries by equipping citizens with the information, training, networks,
and funding they need to become more effective monitors of government revenues and
expenditures." RWI also "works to ensure that the revenues generated by the extractive
industries contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction, through the
promotion of public finance transparency in resource-dependent countries." Revenue
Watch, http://www.revenuewatch.org/about.
49 J. EASTON & R. FERNANDEZ, Sovereign Debt, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 2032 (G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff eds., 1995).
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loans to developing countries., 50  These are loans which are
secured against future resource revenues.5' As the PWYP
recommendations state: "[r]esource-backed loans are often issued
to governments at high interest rates and are paid back by
revenues from future resource extraction. 52  These loans are
characterized as possibly representing "a whole system of parallel
financing, outside of public scrutiny, which supports the shadow
state and provides opportunities for cash to be diverted into private
pockets." 3
Because such loans are not public, information about them is
not available to civil society, in whose name such debts are
arranged.54  Banks, therefore, may be complicit in the
misappropriation of state funds unless they implement procedures
to ensure that loans are being properly used.55 As part of the
current PWYP initiative, banks are asked to "disclose all resource-
backed loans and require that the borrowers agree to be audited in
a transparent fashion, as a condition of receiving the loan.,5 6 In
situations where a state oil company receives a resource-backed
loan, PWYP states that "an audit would need to reveal not only the
company's receipt of loan funds but also subsequent transfers of
money to the government.
57
IV. Banks as Agents of Politically Exposed Persons
Banks may also serve as conduits for plundered assets. High-
level, large-scale corruption by public officials, also referred to as
a kleptocracy, is a particular threat to nations in transition.58
50 Publish What You Pay, Banks, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/





55 Publish What You Pay, supra note 51.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies, supra note 25, at 445; see also W. Michael
Reisman, Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture Indigenous
Spoliation, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 56 (1989); NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER HIGH
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Successor governments in many countries have to chase down
assets that have been stolen by deposed leaders-assets that
moved offshore with banks serving as critical links and, often as
repositories.5 9
In recent years, governments have focused more on the role of
banks as agents of fiduciaries for kleptocrats. While dictators may
secret away large amounts of wealth, they often act in concert with
family members and business associates.60 Moreover, a particular
regime may have elites who are moving ill-gotten gains offshore.6 1
Thus, tracing plundered assets involves following the money trail
of multiple actors-not just one dictator. News reports refer to the
purloined assets of Marcos, Abacha, and Mobutu as individuals,
but their networks were larger.62
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental organization composed of member
governments who fund the FATF on a temporary basis with
specific goals and projects, 63 has developed forty principles that it
asks nations to implement with respect to anti-money laundering. 4
RANKING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT
20-31 (1995).
59 Ramasastry, supra note 25 at 329-330.
60 Id. at 430-48 (discussing role of Marcos family in moving funds offshore); see
also Celia W. Dugger, Returned Loot not Misspent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A13
(discussing return to Nigeria of funds looted by Abacha and his family members); Swiss
Banks to Return Abacha Loot, BBC NEWS, July 12, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/845456.stm ("Nigeria's administration says
General Abacha used a circle of family members, close aides and business associates to
dispose of the cash which he plundered from the state").
61 See, e.g., AFRICAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE LINK BETWEEN
CORRUPTION AND POVERTY: LESSONS FROM KENYA CASE STUDIES 2-3 (2000) (discussing
role of elites in corruption and looting); Gerald Acquah Gasie, Grand Corruption: A
Crime Against Humanity 105 (2005), http://www-personal.buseco.monash.e
du.au/-geraldglTemp/grand-corruption.pdf.
62 See Dugger supra note 60.
63 See FATF-GAFI, General FAQ, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (click "General FAQ"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
64 See FATF-GAFI, The 40 Recommendations of the FATF on Money Laundering,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org (click "40 Recs" hyperlink under "Site Tools") (last visited May
22, 2007) [hereinafter FATF-GAFI 40 Recommendations].
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose
purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is therefore a
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As part of its recommendations, it has focused on "politically
exposed persons" (PEP).65  This is a term of art referring to
"individuals who hold prominent public functions in their own
country., 66 The FATF recommendation asks banks to perform
heightened due diligence when opening an account for such a
person.67 Recommendation 6 states that:
[f]inancial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed
persons, in addition to performing normal due diligence
measures:
a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine
whether the customer is a politically exposed person.
b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing
business relationships with such customers.
c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of
wealth and source of funds.
d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business
relationship In addition to lending, banks have assisted
with capital flight.68
The FATF recommendations do not define the term politically
exposed person, but leave interpretation to various states.
The banking industry has also taken steps toward preventing
money laundering through self-regulation. These regulations
attempt to deal with the concept of PEPs as a way of providing
some common guidance that can apply transnationally. 69 The
voluntary Wolfsberg Principles, created by eleven leading banks,
seek to prevent the use of banking services for "criminal
purposes."7 °  Each signatory bank "endeavor[s] to accept only
"policy-making body" created in 1989 that works to generate the necessary
political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.
The FATF has published 40 + 9 Recommendations in order to meet this
objective.






70 The Wolfsberg Group, http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/index.html (last
visited May 22, 2007).
[Vol. XXXII
2007] ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES & ODIOUS DEBT
those clients whose source of wealth and funds can be reasonably
established to be legitimate.",71 According to guidance
promulgated by the Wolfsburg Group, the term "politically
exposed persons applies to persons who perform important public
functions for a state. 72 The guidance provides examples of PEPs
71 See The Wolfsberg Statement Against Corruption, http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/statement-against-corruption.html (last viewed May 22, 2007). Certain
customers identified during due diligence or enhanced due diligence (initial and
ongoing) may potentially represent a greater degree of risk. Such due diligence or
enhanced due diligence may include identification of negative publicly available
information from credible sources that calls into question a customer's activities
regarding corruption, or, indeed, that indicates that prosecutions or actions have been
taken by governmental authorities and/or law enforcement. The risks and possible
mitigating measures are highlighted below together with any particularly relevant red
flags. Examples include:
3.1. Politically Exposed Persons - PEPs potentially represent higher risk
because they either are in a position to exert undue influence on decisions
regarding the conduct of business by private sector parties, or have access to
state accounts and funds.
Red Flags - Substantial cash or wire transfers into or from an account of a
customer identified as a PEP where such activity is not consistent with
legitimate or expected activity. Particularly substantial activity over a relatively
short time period and/or the improper use of corporate or other vehicles to
obscure ownership may also raise suspicions.
Id.; see also Wolfsberg AML Principles on Private Banking (May 2002),
http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/privat-banking.html.
72 See Wolfsberg's FAQs on Politically Exposed Persons, http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/faq-persons.html. The Wolfsberg Group acknowledges that there is great
deviation in the definition:
The definition used by regulators or in guidance is usually very general and
leaves room for interpretation. For example, the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission in its guidelines on money laundering uses the term "person
occupying an important public function," the US interagency guidance uses
"senior foreign political figure" and the BIS paper Customer due diligence for
banks says "potentates". The term should be understood to include persons
whose current or former ("Rule of thumb": 1 year after giving up any political
function') position can attract publicity beyond the borders of the country
concerned and whose financial circumstances may be the subject of additional
public interest. In specific cases, local factors in the country concerned, such as
the political and social environment, should be considered when deciding
whether a person falls within the definition.
Id.; see also Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 214) (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/1l214/1_21420060804en00290034.p
df ("laying down implementing measures for directive 2005/60/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of 'politically exposed person'
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including:
heads of state, government and cabinet ministers; influential
functionaries in nationalized industries and government
administration; senior judges; senior party functionaries; senior
and/or influential officials, functionaries and military leaders
and people with similar functions in international or
supranational organizations; members of ruling royal families;
senior and/or influential representatives of religious
organizations (if these functions are connected with political,
judicial, military or administrative responsibilities).73
The term "families" "should include close family members such as
spouses, children, parents, and siblings and may also include other
blood relatives and relatives by marriage. 7 4 Additionally, closely
associated persons "include close business colleagues and personal
advisors/consultants to the politically exposed person as well as
persons who obviously benefit significantly from being close to
such a person."75
The Wolfsberg Guidance on PEPs acknowledges that it can be
difficult to identify politically exposed persons because these
individuals may exclude critical information when opening bank
accounts.76 To that end, the principles are a bit disappointing as
they state:
[I]t is a fact that [banks] do not have the necessary powers,
means no information at their disposal to detect such persons.
Banks are restricted in what information they can obtain. They
must rely on the information they are given by clients and that
can be gleaned from business documents or from the media.7 7
Private companies have developed PEPs databases, which provide
details about PEPs and their relatives and associates, as well as
and technical criteria or simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption
on grounds of financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis"). The
European Commission defines politically exposed persons who are entrusted with
prominent public functions including: "heads of State; heads of government, ministers
and deputy or assistant ministers." Id. at 31.
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photographs of these individuals.78
What is important about the emphasis on PEPs is that banks not
only need to verify the identity of such high profile (and possibly
high risk) customers, but must also try to ascertain the source of
their funds. To date, it is unclear whether banks are truly turning
away PEPs if they are unable to substantiate the source of their
deposits. During the summer of 2006, for example, Wholesale
Firms Division of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) visited
sixteen financial firms to determine whether they were compliant
with British anti-money laundering legislation focused on due
diligence and PEPs.79
The FSA noted that while the firms were generally compliant,
there was room for improvement. 80 The FSA noted, in particular
that not all firms were able to produce lists of PEPs on demand.8'
The report further noted that, while firms did thorough checks to
identify PEPs at the account opening stage, the processes used to
determine if/when an existing customer became a PEP were less
formal, with reliance placed on the informal relationship and
knowledge of the client.8
2
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
may also be a useful part of a global regime to stop capital flight
from odious regimes. UNCAC provides a framework for
international cooperation against corruption, including prevention
and law enforcement measures. 83  A critical element in the
78 Id.
79 Financial Services Authority, Politically Exposed Persons ('PEPs'): Good
Practice, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Other-publications/Money/peps.shtml
(last visited May 23, 2007).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 The report also noted that:
the firms we visited defined the reputational risk of PEP business as the risk that
a PEP might be involved in a public scandal, not that they were actually corrupt.
A PEP with a high profile or impending 'whiff of scandal might be
immediately turned away. However, a PEP with lower risk of public
controversy may be more likely to be accepted. This risk assessment was
regardless of the source or legitimacy of the PEP's funds. Reputational risk and
financial crime risk are not the same and steps to mitigate reputational risk will
not always reduce financial crime risk.
Id.
83 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc.
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international fight against corruption is an effort to deny
kleptocrats access to the fruits of their corrupt practices. 4 The
UNCAC provides mechanisms for targeting assets
misappropriated by current and former senior foreign government
or political officials, their close associates and immediate family
members, or other PEPs. 85
The UNCAC focuses on issues such as capital flight and
plunder in several manners. Article 20 asks states to consider
adopting prohibitions on illicit enrichment.86 This is an effort to
make it easier for states to prosecute individuals for corruption, as
it is often difficult to prove corruption, bribery, or plunder directly.
Article 20 states, in particular:
each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal
offense, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is,
a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or
she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful
income.
87
Illicit enrichment is usually defined as a significant increase in
the assets of a government official that she or he cannot
reasonably explain in relation to her or his lawful earnings during
the performance of her or his duties.88 Many developing countries
have established the crime of "illicit enrichment" as a substitute
for corruption offenses because of the difficulty of proving and
prosecuting cases of corruption.89
Article 26 of the UNCAC further provides that state parties
should "establish liability for legal persons" (which would include
A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention
_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf [hereinafter United Nations Convention against
Corruption].
84 Guillermo Jorge, Notes on Asset Recovery in the UN Convention on Corruption
(2006) (online paper), http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/programs/Annua0316.03-
16.06.pdf.
85 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 83.
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banks) for violating the convention.9 ° Finally, Article 52 also
requires states to implement measures to deal with PEPs.9' Article
52 states that state parties "shall take such measures as may be
necessary, in accordance with its domestic law, to require financial
institutions within to ... conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts
sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who are, or
have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and their
family members and close associates. 92
At present, it is too early to tell whether banks are changing
their culture of opening accounts for PEPs. Ideally, the UNCAC
and other related domestic measures are meant to help banks
refuse funds that are the proceeds of corruption. Banks are meant
to turn away dictators and others who cannot substantiate the
source of their loot. To the extent that this is coupled with an
offense focused on illicit enrichment, the international community
has two powerful tools for preventing leaders from draining their
treasuries and moving the funds out of the country.
Critics might assume that some countries will always serve as
offshore havens for kleptocrats. Even if most nations improve
their emphasis on anti-corruption and stopping corrupt PEPs from
moving funds into their banks, some rogue states will offer their
banks as safe havens for stolen monies. FATF engages in a
practice of naming and shaming countries that are non-compliant
with its forty anti-money laundering recommendations. 93
Currently, there are no countries on its blacklist.94 Previously
there have been many. 95 Of course, this does not mean that all
countries are currently well-behaved and vigorously pursing anti-
90 Id. at 14.
91 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 83, at 31.
92 Id.
93 The principal objective of the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
(NCCT) Initiative is to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system to money
laundering by ensuring that all financial centres adopt and implement measures for the
prevention, detection and punishment of money laundering according to internationally
recognized standards. See FATF, Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT)
Initiative, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (click "NCCT initiative" hyperlink; scroll to "About
the NCCT Initiative" hyperlink).
94 Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative, NCCT Timeline,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org (search "NCCT Initiative").
95 Id.
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money laundering measures. It does mean, however, that
countries are improving their performance in response to being
named and shamed by FATF. Why would a blacklist force a
change in behavior? Perhaps due to the reputational risks involved
in blacklisting. However, the fact that the banking system is
global is a more likely explanation. Countries do not want to face
being shut out of global financial markets because of lax anti-
money laundering procedures.
Why is a focus on PEPs preferable to the cancellation of
odious debt? Because this solution can be applied to all PEPs, not
just those that appear to be "odious." As such, the due diligence
model is not dependent on a person making the decisions. Rather,
all PEPs should have to substantiate the source of their funds.
Such a rule does leave some discretion in the hands of bankers, but
the decision-making is tied less to whether a particular regime is
corrupt. Instead, the focus is on determining whether someone is a
prominent public official.96 This determination is inherently less
political and is one that, over time, can become more routine for
bank officials.
V. Conclusion
Even if banks can stop funds from moving offshore, odious
debt and other odious payments will not disappear into thin air.
The two strategies discussed in this article are meant to
complement one another. First, to the extent that creditors'
payments to sovereigns are disclosed (publish what you lend),
kleptocrats should have less incentive to steal, recognizing that
other creditors and the public know what funds have been
disbursed. Second banks should be able to forestall a dictator's
attempts to divert national funds for his own private gain by
refusing to accept deposits whose source cannot properly be
substantiated. Thus, one measure can prevent the creation of
odious debt; or, if the debt is created, the other measure can keep
the funds in the national treasury to be used for repayment by
future governments.
The next time Bono and his friends meet at Davos, they should
not focus should not be on odious debt. Rather, they should
discuss how to ensure meaningful transparency in sovereign
96 See Wolfsberg's FAQs, supra note 72.
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payments and strong implementation of the United Nations
Convention on Corruption.

